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Abstract 
Agricultural production typically is a risky business. Farm households have to tackle several 
risks. So, farm households‟ risk attitude is an important issue connected with decision-making 
and greatly affects their economic performance. Particularly in Senegal, for horticultural 
households, output market price is one of the foremost risks. Moreover, within the household, 
husband and wives may behave differently towards risk. This research provides theoretical 
and empirical evidence of the measures and effects of risk attitude on economic performance 
and on the choice of inputs across gender. More precisely, based on an experimental game 
implemented in the Senegalese Niayes Zone, this paper investigates the gender dimension of 
risk attitude and the causal relationship between risk attitude and allocative inefficiency of the 
choice of inputs. 
The results show that on average male and female producers display absolute risk aversion 
towards the output market price, and that women are as risk averse as men. As expected, and 
in line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that allocative inefficiency in 
the use of inputs increases with risk aversion. We identify recommendations for policy 
decision makers in terms of strategies which may help to dampen men and women producers‟ 
risk aversion towards output market price and repercussions for efficiency. 
 
Key words: risk attitude, output market price, gender, allocative inefficiency, inputs, 
horticultural household.  
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1. Introduction 
Risk can be defined as unsure consequences or an exposure to potentially unfavourable 
circumstances (Smith et al., 1999). By definition, risk is something undesirable (Smith et al., 
1999). Risk is different from uncertainty, which reflects an imperfection in knowledge 
without any particular value assessment about the consequences. While the probability of the 
distribution of outcomes related to risky prospects may be known sometimes, that related to 
uncertain prospects is unknown and unquantifiable, unless subjectively. Risk is related to an 
action and is the chance of winning or losing, usually measured in terms of probability or 
variance (Roumasset et al., 1979). 
Agricultural production typically constitutes a risky business. Farm households face a variety 
of risks. Among them, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) have distinguished two main categories: 
 A production risk due to weather variability, pests and diseases, other environmental 
hazards such as inundation, drought, hurricanes, frost, et cetera; 
 A price risk, particularly regarding the output price, which impacts upon the 
producer‟s decision making and income. 
Most agricultural economists would agree that the producers‟ attitude towards risk determines 
their decision making, particularly in developing countries characterized by a high risk, a low 
income, and few risk-spreading options (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). Not only is the risk 
higher in poor rural economies, affecting farm households in several and profound ways, but 
poor farm households also lack the possibilities to deal with risk (Fafchamps, 2003). With 
limited access to credit and insurance markets, it becomes difficult to manage or cope with 
risk efficiently. While some wealthy households can find strategies to cope with risk and its 
consequences, like income volatility, through the use of their savings or through borrowing 
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money, poor farm households only have recourse to defensive portfolio strategies to smooth 
their income and assets (van den Berg et al., 2009). 
Attitudes towards risk may not only be caused by poverty, but may contribute to maintain and 
emphasize poverty as well. As analysed by Morduch (1994), households may sacrifice their 
expected income in order to cope with risk through, for instance, a diversification of their 
crops or activities even if these are less profitable, but at least more free of risk. Such coping 
strategies provide short-term protection at a long-term cost (Abreha, 2007). To cope with risk, 
low-income households would opt for satisfying their current consumption by selling their 
productive assets and, consequently, by forgoing their expected future income. Such 
inappropriate or inefficient risk-coping strategies may lead to chronic or persistent poverty 
and an increase in the households‟ vulnerability. A producer‟s attitude toward risk and coping 
strategies should be a serious concern for poverty alleviation and economic development, 
particularly in developing countries. 
Extensive research has shown that farmers are risk averse (Binswanger, 1980; Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1993; Smith et al., 1999; Senkondo, 2000; Kumbhakar, 2002; Gomez-
Limon et al., 2002; Fafchamps, 2003; Just and Pope, 2003; Wick et al., 2004; Brons, 2005; 
Simtowe, 2006; Abreha, 2007; van den Berg et al., 2009). These studies attempted to explain 
risk attitudes from individual socio-economic characteristics, such as wealth or income, 
family size, education, age, and gender. There is a mixture of evidence on the relationship 
between risk behaviour and these variables. Especially with regard to gender, while 
Binswanger (1980), Senkondo (2000), Simtowe (2006), and Cramer et al. (2002) have found 
that it does not significantly affect risk attitude, other authors (Wick et al., 2004; Brons, 2005; 
Senkondo, 2000; Croson and Gneezy, 2008; and Borghans et al., 2009) have found that 
women are more risk averse than men. Croson and Gneezy (2008) have tried to explain the 
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gender difference in risk behaviour by the gender dissimilarity in emotional reaction, in 
overconfidence, and in the interpretation of the risk as a challenge or a threat. Accordingly, 
gender and risk aversion remain an interesting research issue. 
Methodologies used to provide empirical evidence of individuals‟ risk attitudes can be 
classified into two main categories: econometric and experimental approaches. The 
econometric approach, mainly based on utility function or expected utility maximization, is 
criticized for overestimating risk aversion, confounding risk behaviour with other 
determinants, such as the resource constraints faced by decision makers (Wick et al., 2004; 
Just and Pope, 2005). This is particularly important in developing countries that are 
characterised by imperfect markets and, as a result, by the non-separability of production and 
consumption decisions (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995; Wick et al., 2004). For these reasons, 
in this study, we adopted the experimental approach to elicit the producer‟s attitude toward 
risk. The experimental approach is rooted in hypothetical questions regarding risk alternatives 
or risky games with or without real monetary payoffs (Binswanger, 1980; Wick et al., 2004; 
Brons, 2005). Obviously, for any approach, one must be careful about interpreting agricultural 
choices or decision making as strong evidence that risk aversion is the primary explanation. 
To better understand the magnitude and implications of risk aversion, attention must be paid 
to the technical, physical, social, and financial structure of agricultural production and the 
inter-temporal dependence of income shocks and marginal utilities (Just and Pope, 2003). 
In sum, attitudes toward risk are an important issue associated with farm households‟ 
behaviour, and may affect farm performance. Particularly in Senegal, for horticultural 
households, the market or output price is a major risk due to its high volatility. Although there 
is extensive theoretical literature on output price risk, the empirical evidence is relatively 
scarce contrary to that regarding production risk, which is the subject of many empirical 
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studies, (Kumbahar, 2002). Furthermore, risk attitude may be considered as an individual 
characteristic. Within a household, the risk attitude may differ between the husband and wives 
who are managers of their separate plots, and this may have consequences for the efficient 
distribution of inputs among them. In addition, the optimal choices of input levels may differ, 
even if the underlying technology would be the same. In Senegal, within horticultural 
households, while men own land, have access to improved irrigation equipment like motor 
pump and can afford to hire labour based on a wage contract or a sharecropping contract, 
women usually do not. Some gender disparities occur in terms of ownership and access to 
productive resources. 
As mentioned by Fafchamps (2003), in the context of developing countries, theory on risk 
behaviour is much more advanced than empirical work is. The scientific significance of this 
research is not only to contribute to the body of empirical evidence, but also to contribute to 
the reinforcement of the theoretical literature about risk attitudes. For this reason, this research 
aims to provide both theoretical and empirical evidence of measures and effects of risk 
attitudes, distinguished by gender. More precisely, this research endeavours to investigate the 
causal relationship between producers‟ risk attitude, the indicators of performance, and the 
decisions made regarding the choice of input, controlling for other exogenous characteristics 
such as age, education, gender, wealth, location, et cetera. 
We will use an experimental method to address the following research questions: 
 Do risk preferences differ between husband and wives, and between male and female 
heads of the household? 
 If so, how are they related to individual characteristics and what are the consequences 
for the household‟s economic performance, and particularly for the allocative 
efficiency of input choice?  
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Allocative efficiency exhibits the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, 
given their respective prices and the production technology. In other words, allocative 
efficiency deals with the extent to which farmers make efficient decisions by using inputs up 
to the level at which their marginal contribution to the production value is equal to the factor 
cost. Consequently, taking market prices as given, allocative efficiency holds when resource 
allocation decisions minimize the cost, and maximize the revenue or profit. 
The results show that, on average, men and women producers exhibit absolute risk aversion 
towards the output market price, and that women are as risk averse as men. As expected, and 
in line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that the allocative 
inefficiency in the use of inputs increases with risk aversion.  
After the presentation of the background, the research objectives and questions, and the main 
findings through this introduction, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The 
next section will present the methodology and more specifically the experimental procedure 
and the theoretical models used to measure risk aversion. We will also discuss the effects of 
risk aversion on the choice of inputs. Then the empirical results and the discussion will 
follow. Finally, the conclusion and policy implications will ensue. 
2. Gender issues in agricultural development 
 
In Africa, and all over the world, regardless of the predominance of a gender bias in the 
access to resources, women present a vital and active force in the elaboration of a multitude of 
strategies that make farming and rural life economically viable and environmentally 
sustainable (Howard-Borjas and Rooij, 1996). Even across European countries, women 
farmers are far from playing passive roles; rather, they are major actors in the processes of 
transformation occurring in food and agricultural systems (Howard-Borjas and Rooij, 1996). 
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In Sub-Saharan African countries, in which on average 29% of the gross domestic product (GDP) is 
generated by agriculture (World Bank, 2007), women contribute about 60-80% (FAO, 1995) of the 
labour force used in the production of food destined for both household consumption and the market. 
However, due to customary norms, women‟s access and control over the resources of production are 
very limited. For instance, women‟s ownership and use of land is usually constrained by inheritance 
and land tenure laws
2
. In Africa, as a result of customary norms rather than religious rules, women are 
usually excluded from land ownership through inheritance in favour of men, who hold the property 
and hand it over to the sons within the household or to other male relatives within the extended family. 
Therefore, in Senegal like in most African countries, while men can inherit land from their parents, 
such is usually not the case for women, who get allocated just a portion of land by their husband, with 
a right of use rather than a right of ownership. For this reason, many African women‟s customary land 
rights are insecure; these usually depend on their marital status and can be lost after a divorce from or 
death of the husband (Joireman, 2008; Koopman, 2009). 
Over all the continents, women own and control far less land than men do (Deere and Doss, 
2006), but particularly in Africa, women rarely own land in their own right (Joireman, 2008; 
Koopman, 2009). However, throughout Africa, many countries like Senegal have reviewed 
some of their legislation related to land use and ownership rights in order to attain a better 
gender equity. Nevertheless, customs and a lack of information still prevent women from 
getting access to land, despite some improvements made on the gender equity regarding land 
use rights. Therefore, until now, these improvements have not been very effective.  
 
Evidence has shown that agricultural production can be improved through equal access to 
production factors for men and women (Alderman et al., 1995; Quisumbing, 2003; Koopman, 
2009). Inequality between men and women, or gender disparities, limits economic growth and 
favours poverty. For this reason, one of the main objectives of the Millennium Development 
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9 
 
Goal (MDG), aimed at reducing poverty and stimulating growth
3
, is to promote gender 
equality and women‟s empowerment. In Senegal, for instance, a National Strategy for Gender 
Equity and Equality (SNEEG) has been elaborated in order to promote gender equality. The 
SNEEG will permit the development of tools and methodologies of gender analysis, the 
implementation of programmes that aim to reinforce the capacity of actors in terms of the 
promotion of gender equity and equality, the promotion of the elaboration of gender-sensitive 
budgets for the different economic sectors, the reinforcement of the decentralisation of funds 
for the economic promotion and support of women‟s activities, and the reinforcement of 
women‟s leadership capacity (DSRP 2, 2006). 
Yet, it still remains a challenge to improve women‟s agricultural performance by improving 
their access to land, to inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, to credit, to extension 
services, and to better technologies, like labour-saving technologies and improved irrigation 
equipment. Women can do much better if their gender-specific constraints related to access to 
land and technology are addressed, and if they can enjoy the right and the economic 
incentives to farm their own plots (Koopman, 2009). The key importance of women in the 
agricultural sector in many parts of the world, and particularly in agriculture-based countries 
in Africa, calls for urgent attention for a more gender-sensitive policy, allowing for gender-
specific production constraints and priorities. 
Particularly at the household level, an economic analysis based on a gender perspective is the 
way to shed light on the differentiation between men and women as economic agents who 
behave differently and specifically, in terms of risk attitude. Regarding access to resources 
within the household, gender inequality arises with an array of social and economic 
implications.  
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Farm households involved in the horticultural supply chain in Senegal, in West Africa, 
provide a convenient context to illuminate such gender issues in agricultural development. 
Usually, in Senegal, within horticultural households, both men and women or husbands and 
wives manage their separate horticultural plots. In this role, they may show different 
preferences or behaviour, notably towards risks. Such differences may have an effect on their 
economic performance and particularly on their efficiency in the allocation of inputs; thus, 
they need to be measured and accounted for. By providing theoretical and empirical evidence 
on these issues, this paper intends to make a scientific contribution to the gender and 
economics literature.  
3. The study area 
We have carried out the research in Senegal, in the Niayes Zone, which is the band 
surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean and located along the axis Dakar – Saint-Louis Regions 
(see the map in figure 1). We have chosen the Niayes Zone as research area because it 
constitutes, together with the Senegal River Valley, an agro-ecological zone of Senegal that is 
excellently suited to horticulture. The Niayes Zone is still the leading horticultural production 
zone and is the best example in terms of an integrated use of favourable factors of production 
and marketing (Matsumoto-Izadifar, 2008). About 80% of the national horticultural 
production comes from the Niayes Zone. This horticultural vocation is conferred by numerous 
potentialities related to favourable climatic, soil and hydraulic conditions as well as by the 
proximity to the urban markets. In fact, its tropical and sunny climate is marked by a great 
maritime influence. The average temperatures, ranging from 22
o
C in January and 31
o
C in 
October, are favourable to horticultural production. They are relatively fresh compared to the 
temperatures observed in the country‟s interior, a relatively consistent humidity varying 
between 58% in December and 83% in August, and a rainfall varying from the North to the 
South from 300 to 500 mm per year. 
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The relief of the Niayes zone is modelled with a succession of sandy dunes and depressions. 
The soil, characterized by a dominant sandy texture, is very favourable to horticultural crops. 
The hydrograph is characterized by the proximity of the water table in most of the areas and 
the presence of lakes, temporary basins and ponds. With its potentialities, the Niayes zone is a 
veritable pivot of development for horticulture. However, in some places, particularly in the 
south zone of Niayes, the availability of water is a limiting factor. While in the centre zone of 
Niayes, the water table can be reached even with a non-cemented, traditional well at a depth 
of one meter, in the south zone of Niayes, near Dakar, in some places, the water table is so 
deep that the source of water used for irrigation is that of the water corporation. It is water 
filtered for drinking, and for this reason it is expensive and its provision is irregular. The 
water constraint has caused some producers to cease their horticultural production completely, 
while others have only partially done so, by reducing their cropped area. 
In terms of demography, in the last national agricultural census done in 1998, the Niayes Zone 
accounted for 35 000 rural households, distributed over 20 000 family residences and more 
than 750 villages (RNA, 1999).  
Overall, the high volatility of the horticultural crops‟ market prices is one of the major risks 
that men and women producers face. Agricultural policies still failed to put into place 
strategies able to stabilize horticultural prices and producers have very limited access to post 
harvest technologies. When producing, men and women cannot reliably predict the price at 
which they will sell their crop. The market price fluctuates a lot from one month to another 
(table 1) and even from day to day. This high market price volatility impacts upon the 
horticultural revenue of the farm households. Even if the yield achieved per hectare is high, if 
the output market price is low, the revenue derived from the production will be low, too. 
Moreover, producers choose the amount of labour and non-labour inputs given the uncertainty 
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of the output market price. Consequently, the way in which horticultural producers behave 
toward the output market price risk may influence their decision-making with regard to the 
choice of inputs and may affect their economic performance. Therefore, the attitude of male 
and female horticultural producers toward the output market price is an important issue to 
take into account while investigating their economic performance. For this reason, men‟s and 
women‟s behaviour toward the output market price risk and its implications for their 
economic performance are of particular interest in this paper. 
Table 1: The volatility of horticultural crops’ market prices in case of tomato and cabbage.  
Period 
Crops‟ market prices (FCFA/kg)4 
Cabbage Tomato 
September 2006 192 175 
October 2006 237 162 
November 2006 264 229 
December 2006 355 633 
January 2007 323 580 
Source: my own survey over 2006-2007 in the Niayes Zone. 
 
                                                     
4
 1 USD=485 FCFA; 1 Euro = 656 FCFA 
13 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of the study area in the Niayes Zone of Senegal, West Africa. 
 
4. The methodology  
The research strategy  
This research uses a quantitative focus, based on a large-scale survey of horticultural households and 
the implementation of an experiment to measure the risk attitude of men and women or 
husband and wives plot managers within the same household. A stratified and random sample of 
203 horticultural households was selected in 30 villages in the study area, the Niayes Zone. This 
horticultural households sample is distributed over the three main subzones of the Niayes Zone and 
namely the Northern (42%), Central (25%) and Southern Niayes Zone (33%).  The stratification was 
based on subzone, villages and gender. Based on a list of the villages classified by subzone and 
district, a sample of 30 villages was selected randomly and proportionally to the subzone size. In each 
village, 6-7 horticultural households were sampled randomly but also in a stratified manner, in order to 
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include horticultural households headed by both men and women. In each village, household heads 
were listed and classified into different groups, based on gender. As much as possible, we randomly 
selected the same number of households (by lottery) in each group. In each horticultural household, 
we surveyed all the male and female managers of horticultural plots. On these plots, men and women 
produce the same horticultural crops and mainly onion, cabbage, and tomato. In this way, we surveyed 
a total of 285 plot managers, including 186 men and 99 women from 203 households. 
However, because of some missing values, the sample size varies a little across some tables 
but this is not an important issue.  
The survey was conducted based on a questionnaire which was administrated by ourselves 
with the support of some enumerators trained before the starting of the survey. 
The experimental design and procedure 
After the completion of the questionnaire, the experimental game of the measurement of risk 
attitude towards the output market price was implemented separately for each man and 
woman plot manager within the household, to avoid any influence between household 
members. Given the current range of output market prices in the village or surrounding zone, 
and given the horticultural crop currently in production in the field (mainly cabbage, onion, 
tomato), we presented a “risky market A” with uncertain output prices of PA1 and PA2. PA1 is 
the low uncertain output price and PA2 the high one; each output price has a probability of 
occurrence of 50%, like a standard gamble. This was explained to the respondents as being 
similar to tossing a coin (head or tail). Another alternative “risk-free market B” was defined, 
with a certain price of PBi, varying between PA1 and PA2 (PA1 < PBi < PA2). Then, we asked the 
producers on which of the two markets they would prefer to sell their production if they were 
to harvest it today. The game started with either a high or a low price PBi and accordingly, the 
certain price PBi was gradually lowered or increased until the plot manager became indifferent 
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or switched from risky market A (uncertain prices PA1 and PA2) to risk-free market B (certain 
price PBi), or the other way round. The output price PBi at which the producer becomes 
indifferent or switches from one market to another corresponds to the certainty equivalent 
price PE of the respondent.  
The objective was to implement a real game with real payment, but due to the limited research 
budget, this was not possible. Nevertheless, lots of efforts were made to bring producers to 
imagining themselves as being in a real situation, so that one could suppose the same results 
would come up if there would be any real payment. Before starting, we explain a lot the game 
to make sure that the producers understand well what we are looking for. We administrated 
ourselves the experimental game to warrant its reliability and to avoid any misunderstanding 
that may arise by using enumerators. The game was administrated in the village, at home or at 
field depending where the producer was. The local language (Woloff) that we all speak was 
used and there were no need for translation. The producers showed great interest and 
understanding; they thoroughly enjoyed the experiment, which they found very innovative. 
5. The theoretical model 
5.1.  Modeling risk attitude 
Within horticultural households, men and women plot managers face an output market price 
risk. When producing, neither the men nor the women can predict perfectly at what price they 
will sell their crop after harvesting. The market price fluctuates a lot and impacts upon the 
horticultural revenue. Even if the yield per hectare achieved is high, if the output market price 
is low, the revenue derived from the production will be low, too. 
Considering the experiment we did with two alternative markets:  
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 Risky market A with uncertain output prices PA1, with a probability of occurrence 1- α 
and output prices PA2, with a probability of occurrence α  
 Market B free of risk, with a certain output price PB with a probability of occurrence 1. 
Following the method of Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) and Cramer et al. (2002), the expected 
utility of the producer when choosing certain market B or uncertain market A is given as: 
 BB PUUE )(                                                                                                               (1) 
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where U is the utility function of wealth and PA2 - PB is the additional benefit won when the 
producer chose to sell the production on risky market A and was lucky to get the high output 
price PA2, whereas  PB - PA1 is the loss when the producer got the low price PA1. 
The second-order Taylor series approximation gives: 
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At the equivalent output price PE from which the producer is willing to shift from uncertain 
market A to certain market B or vice-versa, the expected utility of the uncertain output market 
price E(UA) is equal to the utility of the certain or risk-free output market price U(PE), so that 
equation 2 becomes: 
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So, 
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As defined by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), two types of risk can be distinguished: absolute 
risk aversion (RA) and relative risk aversion (RR), defined as follows:  
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where PE is the certainty equivalent price.  
In simple words, in this experiment, absolute risk aversion refers to the actual amount of 
money a producer will choose to hold in risky market, given a certain level of output price. 
The relative risk aversion can be defined as the percentage of output price held in risky 
market, for a given level of output price. 
Considering the experiment, α was set to ½, then the risk aversion scores can be deduced as 
follows: 
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The first hypothesis tested is whether or not men and women horticultural plot managers 
within the household behave differently towards the output market price risk. The review of 
the literature shows controversial evidence about gender and risk attitude.  
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5.2.  Modeling the effect of risk on the efficiency of the choice of inputs  
Suppose that the choice of the level of input used for production is a function of the attitude 
toward risk. When producing, the input price is known but such is not the case for the output 
price. Producers then use the input, given the uncertainty of the output market price. In this 
way, it might turn out that producers with a higher risk aversion use less input than less risk 
averse producers. Accordingly, risk aversion may have an effect on the marginal value 
product of the input, which should equal to the input price if allocative efficiency holds. 
Therefore, we conjecture that more risk averse producers are less allocatively efficient. 
Based on the conventional concept of allocative efficiency, there is a non-risky efficient level 
of input use or an optimal level of input use for a risk-neutral landowner and this is considered 
as the benchmark for efficiency. However, it may be also optimal for risk averse producers to 
use less input when the output market prices fluctuate. Some economists would argue that 
these risk averse producers who choose to use less inputs are efficient, too. The traditional 
concept of allocative efficiency assumes certainty. Under uncertainty, the traditional measure 
may no longer be appropriate. We may posit that risk aversion should affect allocative 
efficiency.  
Consider a male or female producer with a profit π derived from horticultural production, 
specified as follows: 
XPwLLXfP XY  ),(                                                                                     (6) 
Where PY is the output price, f is the output, which is a function of input X and labour L, w is 
the household labour opportunity cost, PX is the input price, and θ is the random variable 
associated with the output price risk, with an expected value one and variance σ2 (Eθ=1 and 
Varθ= σ2). 
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The objective of the producer is to maximize the expected utility of profit EU(π), defined as: 
 Max ]),([ XPwLLXfPEU XY                                                                            (7) 
The producer has to optimize production, by choosing an amount of input X, so that: 
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As PX, PY and fX’ are non-random, the equation becomes: 
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The left-hand side of the equation corresponds to the ratio marginal value product of input X 
and its price, and this corresponds to the measured indicator of allocative efficiency. The 
right-hand side is the ratio of the expected marginal utility of the profit over the expected 
marginal utility of the random profit. So, the equation establishes the relationships between 
the producer‟s allocative efficiency and the marginal utility of the expected random profit. 
Furthermore, by a first-order approximation of θ (the random variable associated with the 
output price risk) around 1, it follows: 
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where the suffix ‘θ=1’ indicates that the value should be taken at this point. Doing so, 
and using that Eθ=1 and that E(θ-1)2=σ2,  and ignoring higher-order derivatives, we can 
see that   
fPUUUE Y)(")('])('[
2                                                                  (10) 
With the variance σ2 equal to: 
112)1( 2222   EEE  
Then 
)(')](")1[()(' 2'1  UUEUEU   
Knowing the expected marginal utility of the profit EU‟(π) and the expected marginal utility 
of the random profit EU‟(π)θ, equation 9 can be written as: 
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where   is the expected value of profits.  
Similarly, U‟(π)≈U‟( ) + (θ-1)U”(  )PYf 
so EU‟(π)= U‟( ) 
Knowing the producer‟s risk attitude, defined by the absolute risk aversion score RA: 
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Replacing U” by its value gives: 
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As the relative risk aversion RR is related to the random part of the revenues only, it is: 
AYR fRPR   
Then :  
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This equation suggests that an allocative efficiency of inputs is a function of the producer‟s 
risk aversion and the variance σ2 of the random variable  associated with output market price 
risk.  
If 
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then, producers choose the input in such a way that its marginal value product over input price 
(
X
XY
P
fP '
), which corresponds to the efficiency rate is equal to unity. This means that, in this 
case, producers are fully allocatively efficient. The marginal product of input ( 'Xf ) is equal to 
the ratio input price over output price. This means that producers choose the optimum amount 
of input X*.  
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For the risk averse producers, the absolute risk aversion score RA and the relative risk 
aversion RR are positive. In addition, if the expected utility function U(π) is a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function U‟‟(π)<0, σ2 is positive and σ2RR<1, then it follows:  
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Consequently, risk averse producers are allocatively inefficient, which means they use sub-
optimally low levels of input. When the absolute risk aversion score RA or the relative risk 
aversion score RR increases, the allocative inefficiency increases as well. In other words, the 
greater the risk aversion score is, the greater the allocative inefficiency is, too. On the other 
hand, for producers who are risk lovers, the absolute risk aversion score RA and the relative 
risk aversion score RR are negative. In that case, it follows that they are allocatively inefficient 
and they overuse the input, which means that they use it at a level greater than the optimum 
one. Only risk-neutral producers (the absolute risk aversion score RA and the relative risk 
aversion score RR are equal to zero) are fully allocatively efficient. They use the input at the 
optimum level to equalize the marginal value product to the unit input price. 
The same theory holds for the labour input, for which the relationships between allocative 
efficiency and risk aversion can be specified as follows: 
R
Y
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The second hypothesis tested is that more risk averse producers allocate their inputs 
(fertilizers, seeds, pesticides) less efficiently. 
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5.3.The empirical model and estimation of effect of risk on the choice of inputs  
Following Zellner et al. (1966), as quoted by Kumbhakar (2002), we assume that the expected 
output price YP  is equal to the observed output price PY. 
Moreover, gender-specific production functions were estimated to derive male and female producers‟ 
marginal value product of inputs. Particularly, we used gender-specific stochastic frontier production 
functions specified as follows
5
: 
log(fj) = β0 + β1 log(Plotj) +  β2 log(Labhj) + β3 log(Laboj) + β4 log(Inputj) +  β5 log(Irreqj) +   
             β6 Seas_01+ Vj - Uj                                                                                                                                                               (17)    
where the dependent variable logarithm output per hectare (fj) obtained by plot manager j who is a 
male or a female household member (j{men, women}) is a function of logarithms6 of :  
 Plotj, the plot area cultivated in hectare,  
 Labhj, the household labour in hours per hectare, 
 Laboj, the hired labour in hours per hectare,  
 Inputj, the aggregated cost of other inputs used (seed, pesticides, mineral and organic 
fertilizers) in fcfa per hectare (inputs assumed to be perfect substitutes), 
 Irreqj, the aggregated cost of irrigation equipment used on the plot (a motorized pump, a 
manual pump, wells, drip systems, sprinklers, seals, ropes, pulleys, …) in fcfa per hectare, 
 Seas_01, the dummy variable horticultural season (1 = 1st season and 2nd season, 0 = 3rd 
season), 
 Vj is the random error term assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) N(0, 
v
2
).  
                                                     
5
 This paper is part of a PhD thesis and the stochastic frontier production specification is used for the 
requirements of other analysis of technical efficiency in another paper.  
6
 To handle the cases of plots with zero input or labour, the logarithm of the variable plus one is used: 
log(variable+1). 
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 Uj, time-invariant inefficiency effects or fixed effects measuring heterogeneity. 
The variables included in the production functions are hypothesized to have an effect on the output 
obtained by male and female plot managers. Initially, a translog functional form was specified, but the 
interaction variables have been dropped because they are not significant and do not help to improve 
the specification. For the same reasons, other variables like plot characteristics have been excluded.  
As the production function estimated is log-linear, the coefficients  correspond to the elasticity of the 
production f, observed per hectare with respect to input X: 
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Knowing the producer‟s marginal value product derived from the gender-specific production 
functions, the allocative inefficiency of inputs can be deduced ( 1
'

X
XY
P
fP
). So, the effect of 
the output price risk on the allocative inefficiency of input  can be tested, using the following 
function: 
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where: 
 M is the risk perception measured in terms of the appreciation of market price 
predictability (1 = unpredictable). It was asked to male and female plot manager 
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whether it is possible or not to predict the output market price for next month given 
the current market price P;   
 S is a vector of status, including the producer‟s socio-economic characteristics, such as 
the status of the head of household, the gender, age, education, number of wives, the 
women‟s status (first wife, second wife, et cetera), the access to credit and extension 
services, et cetera; 
 W is a vector of wealth, including the men‟s annual income, the women‟s annual 
income, the share of the men‟s off-farm income, the share of the women‟s off-farm 
income, the household‟s labour endowment (or household size), the household‟s land 
endowment, the plot area cropped, et cetera;  
 L is a vector of location: the north, centre, or south zone of Niayes. 
These variables are selected for the empirical estimation because they are supposed to have an 
effect on men‟s and women‟s allocative inefficiency. All the variables came from gender 
disaggregated data collected from own detailed household‟s surveys carried out on men‟s and 
women‟s plots managers. Comprehensive surveys allowed collecting gender disaggregated 
data related to land, labour endowment and the different components of horticultural 
household‟s yearly income coming dominantly from horticulture and also from non 
horticultural crops, off-farm activities (cattle breeding, trading …) and remittance.   
Fully allocatively efficient producers choose the input in such a way that its marginal value 
product divided by input price, which corresponds to the efficiency rate is equal to one. Thus, 
the marginal value product of input divided by input price minus one (the left-hand side of 
equation 20) is used to capture the allocative inefficiency of inputs.   
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6. The empirical results  
6.1.  Measurement of the risk attitude toward the output market price across gender 
Certainty equivalent prices 
An experimental game was implemented to measure men‟s and women‟s attitude toward the 
output market price risk, as described in detail previously. The output market price at which 
the producer becomes indifferent or switches from one market to another corresponds to the 
certainty equivalent price PE of the respondent. The uncertain prices range on average from 
208 to 400 fcfa/kg for men and from 221 to 422 fcfa/kg for women. This small gender 
difference is only due to the difference of the distribution of men and women over the crops 
harvested and sold (cabbage, onion and tomato) during the implementation of the game. For 
each crop, the same uncertain output prices were applied both for men and women and 
defined according to the current output market price found in the village or surroundings 
during the experiment.  
The average equivalent prices of men and women are close and are, respectively, 277 and 307 
fcfa/kg. Graph 2 depicts over gender the modified minimum and maximum prices of the risky 
market and the modified certainty equivalent price, measured in deviation of the mean of the 
minimum, maximum, and equivalent prices. In other words, theses modified prices are the 
difference between the average output prices of risky market of all the plots managers  
(population) and the output prices of each plot manager (observation) involved in the 
experimental game. For both men and women plot managers, some of the certainty equivalent 
prices show up below the X axis and others above it, showing a difference in risk attitude. The 
more risk averse have their certainty equivalent prices below the X axis and close to the 
minimum prices. 
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Figure 2: Modified minimum and maximum prices of the risky market and modified certainty 
equivalent prices over gender.  
Risk aversion scores across gender 
The absolute risk aversion scores (RA) and relative risk aversion scores (RR), derived from the 
equations 5, are presented in table 2. The results show that, on average, both men and women 
producers are risk averse, as shown by their positive risk aversion scores. The standard 
deviations are high, suggesting that absolute and relative risk aversion scores vary among men 
and women. Surprisingly, the men‟s risk aversion scores are greater than the women‟s, but the 
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two groups‟ mean comparison t-test indicates that the difference is not significant even at the 
10% level. This finding should not be too surprising. Indeed, women involved in horticultural 
production are used to going to the market to sell their own production, or through the small 
trading they are engaged in as an off-farm activity. For these reasons, women have as much 
knowledge about how the market operates as men have, and even more knowledge than men 
who sell their products at the field gate. This may explain why women are as risk averse as 
men towards the output market price. While usually in most African countries, female farmers 
are responsible for subsistence production while male farmers are responsible for cash crops 
(Bryson, 1981, Doss, 2001), such is not the case in the study area, the Niayes Zone of 
Senegal. In this setting, the customary arrangement is that the men are mainly responsible for 
feeding their family and both the men and the women are fully involved in horticultural 
production which is a cash crop. The staple food is mainly rice and is bought by men 
household-heads from their horticultural revenue.  
The finding is in line with findings by Binswanger (1980) in India, Senkondo (2000) in 
Tanzania, and Van den Berg et al. (2008) in Nicaragua. They found no significant effect of 
gender on risk attitude, although these studies dealt with other types of risks, like risks in 
agroforestry decision-making, wealth, and environmental hazards. However, this finding 
challenges several authors, such as Kochar (1999), Byrnes et al. (1999), Wick et al. (2004), 
Brons (2005), Dohmen et al. (2005), Cohen et al. (2007), Croson and Gneezy (2008), and 
Borghans et al. (2009), who found that women are more risk averse than men. Croson and 
Gneezy (2008) have reviewed the experimental economics studies on the impact of gender on 
risk preference and have concluded that men are more risk-taking than women do. However, 
the studies reviewed by these authors are based on experiments realized mainly with students 
or a university population, carried out in European countries. Moreover, Croson and Gneezy 
(2008) have found from their review that managers and professional business persons are the 
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exception to the rule that men take more risk than women do (quoting Atkinson et al. (2003), 
Johnson and Powell (1994), Master and Meier (1988)). Other general studies (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008) have shown that attitudes towards risk between men and women vary by 
context. From all these evidences we can conclude that there is no clear-cut relation between 
gender and risk attitude; the type of risk and the cultural, social, and economic context do 
matter a lot indeed. 
Table 2: Risk aversion scores across gender. 
Gender Obs. 
Absolute risk aversion 
scores (RA) 
Relative risk aversion 
scores (RR) 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Men  160 0.0015 0.0110 0.082 2.806 
Women  77 0.0002 0.0107 0.067 2.480 
Combined 237 0.0011 0.0109 0.077 2.703 
Difference (Men – 
Women) 
 0.0012  0.015  
t-statistic (H0 : diff. =0)     0.827 (P=0.40) 0.038 (P=0.96) 
The distribution of the risk aversion class across gender 
The analysis of the distribution of the risk aversion scores reveals that more than half of the 
producers are risk averse, with positive absolute and relative risk aversion scores. More than 
33% of the producers exhibit risk-loving or risk-preferring behaviour, as indicated by their 
negative risk aversion scores. Only very few producers are risk-neutral, with a risk aversion 
score equal to zero. The gender comparison shows the same tendency of the distribution of 
the risk aversion scores. However, the percentage of men ruling out risk-loving attitudes is 
lower than that of women, about 7%. As a result, 4% more of the men are risk averse with 
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respect to output market price volatility in comparison to the women. Nevertheless, the 
differences remain statistically not significant even at the 10% level. Table 3 tells more about 
the distribution of the risk aversion scores and classes across gender. 
Table 3: The distribution of risk aversion classes across gender. 
Risk aversion class 
Men Women Overall 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Risk averse (RA>0) 91 57 41 53 132 56 
Risk neutral (RA= 0) 12 7 3 4 15 6 
Risk loving (RA<0) 57 36 33 43 90 38 
Total 160 100 77 100 237 100 
 
Risk attitude, individual and household characteristics 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression of men‟s and women‟s absolute and relative risk 
attitude, controlling for all individual and household characteristics together. The results 
suggest that the significant determinant of risk attitude at the 5% level is only the household‟s 
land ownership. Unexpectedly, the household‟s land ownership has a positive effect on men‟s 
and women‟s risk attitude. The more a household or its men (since they are the main owners) 
possess land, the more risk averse men and women are. The explanation may be the land 
abundant households have more crops to sell, and therefore are more sensitive or careful to 
fluctuating prices
7
. This finding contradicts the decreasing effect of wealth on risk aversion, 
but is somewhat in line with findings elsewhere by Senkondo (2000) in Tanzania, and Cohen 
                                                     
7
 The same game was implemented for each male and female plot manager within the household. We specified 
not only a “risky market A” with uncertain output prices of PA1 and PA2, and a “risk-free market B” with a certain 
price of PBi, varying between PA1 and PA2 (PA1 < PBi < PA2) but also a fixed quantity to be traded. See section 5.2 
for more details. 
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and Einav (2007) in Israel. However, as risk aversion is widely considered to be decreasing 
with wealth, this finding contradicts several evidences, found by Binswanger (1980) in India, 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) in India, Senkondo (2000) in Tanzania, Gomez-Limon et 
al. (2002) in Spain, Wik et al. (2004) in Zambia, Abreha (2007) in Ethiopia, and Van den 
Berg et al. (2009) in Peru. 
Other variables that are supposed to capture the wealth effects, such as the household size, 
measured in terms of the number of members, and the size of the cropped area, are negatively 
related to risk attitude but are not significant at the 10% level. All the other socio-economic 
characteristics, such as the plot manager‟s gender and age, the household head‟s gender, 
separate female plots, and the location or zone, are positively related to attitude toward risk, 
but are not significant even at the 10% level. The variable education was also not significant, 
with a very low coefficient, the reason for which it was dropped from the regression (table 4). 
Table 4: Risk attitude, individual and household characteristics (robust cluster in the 
household). 
Dependent variable: risk aversion 
score of plot manager 
Absolute risk aversion 
(RA *100) 
Relative risk aversion  
(RR ) 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Plot manager‟s gender_01 (1=female) -0.366 0.228 -0.927 0.600 
Household head‟s gender (1=female) .221 0.386 0.214 1.161 
Plot manager‟s age (years) 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.019 
Household size (members) -0.007 0.015 -0.006 0.043 
Household land endowment (ha) 0.042** 0.022 0.104* 0.062 
Cropped plot size (ha) -0.354 0.413 0.093 1.048 
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Separate female plots (1=yes) .121 0.196 0.354 0.490 
Location or zone_01 (1=Zone Nord) 0.003 0.155 0.076 0.402 
Constant 0.010 0.398 -0.525 1.064 
Observations (plot managers) 
Clusters (households) 
F (8, 162) 
R-squared 
211 
163 
0.85 
0.02 
 208 
160 
0.61 
0.03 
 
Note: **, * significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
6.2.  The effect of risk attitude on the allocative efficiency of inputs  
As risk behaviour determines decision making, it may have an effect on producers‟ economic 
performance and particularly on their efficiency. For this reason, the hypothesis tested is 
whether more risk averse plot managers allocate their inputs (seed, fertilizers and pesticides) 
less efficiently. To empirically test this hypothesis, gender-specific allocative inefficiency 
models are used for risk averse plot managers (RA>0 or RR>0).  
As expected and in line with the theoretical model, the regression of the allocative 
inefficiency of inputs shows a positive relationship with plot manager‟s absolute risk aversion 
score for both the men and women who are behaving as risk averse producers. This suggests 
that without controlling for any characteristic, the allocative inefficiency increases with risk 
aversion. The more men and women plot managers are risk averse, the more they are likely to 
use fewer inputs than the optimum amount given the output market price risk. The analysis of 
the coefficients of the regression indicates that a one unit increase in risk aversion score times 
100 (RA*100) leads to an increase by 0.79 of men‟s inefficiency (P=0.08) and by 0.12 of 
women‟s inefficiency (P=0.59).  
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Controlling for risk perception, the plot managers‟ socio-economic characteristics, and 
location, the estimation suggests that the allocative inefficiency is positively related at the 
10% level to the absolute risk aversion scores of men and women who rule out risk averse 
behaviour (table 5). The effects of risk averse behaviour on the allocative efficiency are 
statistically significant at the 1% level for men and the 10% level for women. This means that 
the more men‟s and women‟s risk aversion scores are closer to zero (risk-neutral), the more 
they are allocatively efficient. This behaviour corresponds to the theoretical model‟s 
predictions, since the risk-neutral, allocatively efficient producers are the benchmark.  
Table 5 gives coefficients for men of 1.22 and for women of 0.28 as far as RA is concerned, 
and 0.55 for men and 2.36 for women where RR is taken. So, women‟s input allocation 
inefficiency is much more sensitive to relative risk, and men‟s to absolute risk.  
Moreover, for men, risk perception measured in terms of the appreciation of the predictability 
of the output market price is positively related to the allocative inefficiency. Perceiving the 
output market price as unpredictable and accordingly as a real risk, increases the allocative 
inefficiency, although the effect is not significant at the 10% level. For women, the effect of 
risk perception could not be measured because they have an almost similar perception. 
In addition, the results indicate that among the variables controlled, those having a significant 
effect (10% level) on the inefficiency are age and location for risk averse men. The allocative 
inefficiency increases with the age of male plot managers. Accordingly, the younger risk 
averse men are more allocatively efficient than the elder men. The negative and significant 
correlation of the dummy variable centre zone indicates that male producers located in the 
centre zone of Niayes allocate their inputs more efficiently compared to those in the north and 
the south. Producers located in the centre and south of the Niayes Zone have more marketing 
opportunity because they are surrounded by big daily and weekly rural horticultural markets 
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and are also closer to Dakar. These marketing advantages may impact positively on their 
output in value and, consequently, on their marginal value product and their efficiency. 
Other variables such as household education, the number of wives, and access to credit have 
the expected negative sign for risk averse men, but do not significantly influence their 
allocative inefficiency. Similarly, the interaction risk aversion score and women‟s status as 
first, second or third wife is negatively related to inefficiency, but the effect is not significant 
at the 10% level (table 5). 
On the other hand, considering relative risk aversion scores, the estimates present some 
similarity in terms of sign and magnitude (table 5). 
Table 5: Estimation results of the effects of the producer’s risk attitude on the allocative 
inefficiency of inputs over gender.    
Allocative inefficiency 
 
Absolute risk averse 
(RA *100>0) 
Relative risk averse 
(RR >0) 
Men Women Men Women 
Risk aversion score of plot 
manager (RA *100 or RR) 
1.22*** 
(0.49) 
0.28*  
(0.15) 
0.55  
(0.24) 
2.36  
(2.69) 
Predictability of output 
price_01 (1=unpredictable) 
0.56  
(0.60) 
 0.53  
(0.62) 
 
Age of plot manager (years) 0.04* 
(0.02) 
 0.04*  
(0.02) 
 
Household head„s 
education_01 
 (1=educated) 
-0.22 
(0.75) 
 -0.20  
(0.78) 
 
Number of wives -0.44  
(0.29) 
 -0.42  
(0.31) 
 
Risk aversion * Women‟s 
status_01 (1=first wife)  
 -0.04  
(0.24) 
 -1.22  
(1.34) 
Access to credit_01 (1=access) -0.64  
(0.51) 
 -0.64  
(0.53) 
 
Plot size (ha) 0.36  
(1.04) 
4.79  
(3.26) 
0.25  
(1.08) 
-0.20  
(8.97) 
Centre zone_01 (1=Center) -1.06*  
(0.58) 
 -0.51  
(0.61) 
 
South zone_01 (1=South)  0.27  
(0.46) 
 -0.69  
(1.63) 
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Constant -1.45  
(1.37) 
-0.29  
(0.24) 
-0.60  
(1.43) 
-1.89  
(2.40) 
Observations (plot managers) 
F  
R-squared 
85 
1.88* 
0.16 
24 
1.02 
0.07 
85 
1.03 
0.09 
22 
0.53 
0.11 
Note: ***, **, * significant respectively at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level; standard errors in 
parentheses, and for women or wives, robust standards errors adjusted for clusters in 
households to allow for an intra-household correlation (1-3 wives per household). 
Furthermore, the husband decides on the seed variety to use for 17% of the women plot 
managers, while he decides on the quantity and timing of mineral fertilizers and organic 
fertilizers to apply for 30% and 11% of the women plot managers, respectively. Accordingly, 
the decision maker, whether it is the woman plot manager herself or her husband and his/her 
risk attitude, may have an effect on women‟s allocative inefficiency in the choice of inputs. 
To test this hypothesis, the allocative inefficiency of the inputs used by women is regressed 
first on the dummy variable decision maker on inputs (1=women, 0=husband), second on the 
risk attitude of the decision maker, controlling for women‟s risk aversion scores or not. The 
dummy variable decision maker turns out not significant at the 10% level, either controlling 
for women‟s risk attitude or not. The same result holds for the decision maker‟s risk attitude. 
Accordingly, this finding shows that even if for some women, the husband decides on the use 
of inputs, it is likely that women always have their say and their risk attitude significantly 
affects their allocative inefficiency, as shown in table 5. 
7.   Conclusion and policy implications 
Agricultural production is typically a risky business. Farm households have to tackle several 
risks. For this reason, farm households‟ risk attitude is an important issue connected with their 
decision-making and may greatly affect their economic performance. Particularly in Senegal, 
for horticultural households, the output market price is one of the foremost risks, due to its 
high volatility. During the production, a household can never be completely certain at which 
price they will be able to sell their produce later on, after harvesting. Moreover, within the 
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same household, the husband and wives may behave differently towards risk. This research 
has provided theoretical and empirical evidence of the measures and effects of risk attitude 
across gender on economic performance and on the choice of inputs. More precisely, based on 
an experimental game implemented in Senegal‟s Niayes Zone, this paper has investigated the 
gender dimension of risk attitude and the causal relationship between risk attitude and the 
allocative inefficiency of the choice of inputs, controlling for other exogenous characteristics. 
The results showed that, on average, men and women producers are absolutely risk averse 
towards the output market price. In addition, men are as risk averse as women are. The reason 
for this is that women horticultural producers are used to going to the market to sell their own 
produce or to engage in small trading as an off-farm activity. Consequently, women know a 
lot about how the market operates, at least as much as men know. This finding is in line with 
some other findings elsewhere, but challenges the common finding that women are more risk 
averse than men are. Finally, we can conclude that, depending on the type of risk measured, 
the knowledge or the experience about the risk and the cultural, social, and economic context, 
women may behave as risk aversely as men do, or even less.  
Controlling for individual and household characteristics together showed that the only 
significant determinant at the 5% level of men‟s and women‟s risk attitude is household land 
ownership. The more the household or its men (since they are the main owners) possess land, 
the more risk averse men and women are toward the output market price. This finding 
challenges the common decreasing effect of wealth on risk aversion, but is somewhat in line 
with findings elsewhere. 
As expected and in line with the theoretical model, the empirical evidence shows that over 
gender and risk-behaving group, and controlling for individual socio-economic characteristics 
and location, the attitude towards the output market price risk significantly affects men‟s and 
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women‟s allocative inefficiency in the use of inputs (seed, fertilizers and pesticides). 
Specifically, the results suggest that the more risk averse men and women plot managers are, 
the more they allocate their inputs inefficiently. This means that the more men and women 
producers are risk averse, the more they are likely to use a suboptimum amount of inputs, 
given the output market price risk. A one unit increase in the risk aversion score times 100 of 
men and women with risk averse behaviour, leads to an increase of allocative inefficiency by 
1.22 for men and 0.28 for women, controlling for location and individual characteristics. This 
increase is statistically significant. In addition, the estimation shows that other variables 
having a significant effect on the allocative inefficiency of inputs are age and location. The 
allocative inefficiency increases with the age. Producing in the centre zone of Niayes, 
significantly decreases the allocative inefficiency; this may be due to more marketing 
opportunities. 
The findings resulted in a number of recommendations to policy decision makers, in terms of 
strategies that may help to dampen down men and women producers‟ risk aversion towards 
the output market price and its repercussions on their efficiency. Such strategies should aim at 
reducing and tackling, or coping with, the output market price risk. 
Furthermore we can conclude, basing ourselves indirectly on the research outcomes and 
directly on the field observations, that to cope better with the output market price risk, men 
and women producers need to have access to adequate means of storage and conservation of 
horticultural products, which by nature are easily perishable. Being able to conserve their 
production may allow producers to delay and to spread the selling over time, in order to avoid 
an oversaturation of the market and its repercussions. Training in postharvest technologies is 
an important prerequisite to increase the ability of producers to preserve the quality and the 
freshness of the produce for a longer time. Research institutes and extension services have a 
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lot to do to attain an efficient transference of postharvest technologies to producers. However, 
these measures may only have a significant effect if they are coupled with access to a suitable 
system of microcredit for personal consumption, which will allow producers to be not 
constrained to sell off their production. 
At the community level, horticultural producers should be better organized in order to have 
more market power in relation to the middlemen traders, who used to impose their price. 
Some efforts should be oriented toward the reinforcement of the organization of horticultural 
producers. Making horticultural production zones more reachable through an improvement of 
the roads may facilitate producers‟ access to diverse markets. An efficient and daily updated 
system of information about the market price, accessible to producers and based on the new 
technology of communication (the mobile phone, for instance) may be helpful to deal with the 
market price risk. A smart policy of market protection may produce significant effects on the 
regulation of the market for some products, like onion, during the period of overproduction, 
while preserving the consumers‟ interests, too. This set of strategies needs some empirical 
evidence and may be a good agenda for future research. 
References 
1. Alderman H., P.-A. Chaippori, L. Haddad, J. Hoddinott and R. Kanbur 1995. Unitary 
versus collective models of the household: Is it time to shift the burden of proof? World 
Bank Research Observer 10(1): 1-19. 
2. Abreha, N. H., 2007. An economic analysis of farmers‟ risk attitudes and farm 
households‟ responses to rainfall risk in Tigray Northern Ethiopia. PhD thesis. 
Wageningen: Wageningen University. 
3. Atkinson, S. M., S. B. Baird and M. B. Frye, 2003. Do female mutual fund managers 
manage differently? Journal of Financial Research 26: 1-18. 
4. Binswanger, H. P., 1980. Attitudes toward risk: experimental measurement in Rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3): 395-407. 
39 
 
5. Borghans, L., B. H. H. Golsteyn, J. J. Heckman and H. Meijers, 2009. Gender differences 
in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion 
Paper No 3985., 1-17,  Germany:  IZA.Brons, J. E., 2005. Activity diversification in rural 
livelihoods. The role of farm supplementary income in Burkina Faso. PhD thesis. 
Wageningen: Wageningen University. 
6. Bryson, J. C., 1981. Women and Agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for 
Development (An Exploratory Study).,Journal of Development Studies, 17(3), pp. 29-46. 
 
7. Byrnes, J. P., D. C. Miller and W. D. Schafer, 1999. Gender differences in risk taking: a 
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 125(3): 367-383. 
8. Cohen, A. and L. Einav, 2007. Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. 
American Economic Review, 97(3): 745-788. 
9. Cramer, J. S., J. Hartog, N. Jonker and C. M. Van Praag, 2002. Low risk aversion 
encourages the choice for entrepreneurship: an empirical test of a truism. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(1): 29-36. 
10. Croson, R. and U. Gneezy, 2008. Gender difference in preferences. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 47 (2), 1-27. 
11. Deere, C. D. and C. R. Doss, 2006. The gender asset gap: What do we know and why does it 
matter? Feminist Economics 12(1/2): 1-50. 
12. Dohmen, T., A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, J. Schupp and G. G. Wagner, 2005. 
Individual risk attitudes: new evidence from a large, representative, experimentally-
validated survey. German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) Working Paper 511. 
13. Doss, C., 2001. Designing Agricultural Technology for African Women Farmers: Lessons 
from 25 Years of Experience”, World Development, 29(12), pp. 2075-2092. 
14. DSRP 2, 2006. Document de Stratégie pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté 
2006-2010. Sénégal.  
15. Eckel, C. and Grossman, P., 2008. Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental 
Evidence. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1, pp. 1061-1073. 
 
16. Fafchamps M., 2003. Rural poverty, risk and development. UK, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
17. FAO, 1995. Women, agriculture and rural development: a synthesis report of the Africa region 
 
40 
 
18. Gomez-Limon, J. A., L. Riesgo and M. Arriaza, 2002. Paper prepared for presentation at 
the X
th
 EAAE Congress. Zaragoza (Spain), 28-31 August 2002.  
19. Howard-Borjas, P., S. de Rooij, 1996. Farm women, adjustment, and sustainable agro-food 
systems in Eastern and Western Europe. A paper prepared for the World Food Summit 
Preparatory Conference. Department of Gender Studies in Agricultural University Wageningen. 
Rome: FAO. 
20. http://www.fao.org/Gender/en/agrib3-e.htm 
21.  Johnson, J. E. V. and P. L. Powell, 1994. Decision making, risk and gender: are managers 
different? British Journal of Management, 5:123-138. 
22. Joireman, S. F., 2008. The mystery of capital formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, property 
rights and customary law. Wold Development 36(7): 1233-1246. 
23. Just, R. E. and R. D. Pope, 2003. Agricultural risk analysis: adequacy of models, data, and 
issues. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 85(5): 1249-1256 
24. Kochar, A., 1999. Smoothing consumption by smoothing income: hours-of-work 
responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural India. The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 81(1): 50-61. 
25. Koopman, J. E., 2009. Globalization, gender, and poverty in the Senegal River Valley. Feminist 
Economics 15(3), 253-285. 
26. Kumbhakar, S. C., 2002. Risk preference and productivity measurement under output 
price uncertainty. Empirical Economics, 27: 461-472.  
27. Master, R. and R. Meier, 1988. Sex differences and risk taking propensity of 
entrepreneurs. Journal of Small Business Management, January, 31-35.   
 
28. Matsumoto-Izadifar, Y., 2008. Senegal Making Better Use of Agribusiness Potential. OECD, 
Business for Development. 
 
29. Ministère de l‟Agriculture et de l‟Elevage du Sénégal - Recensement National de l‟Agriculture 
1998-99 (RNA), 2000. Volume 6 : Rapport général du recensement de l‟horticulture péri-urbaine. 
Dakar : Ministère de l‟Agriculture et de l‟Elevage, FAO. 
        
30. Morduch, J., 1994. Poverty and vulnerability. American Economic Review, 84: 221-225 
31. Newbery, D. M. G. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1981. The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization: 
A Study in the Economics of Risk. New York: Oxford University Press.  
41 
 
32. Quisumbing, A. R., 2003. What have we learned from research on intrahousehold allocation? In 
Household decisions, gender, and development: a synthesis of recent research, / edited by Agnes 
R. Quisumbing. Washington: IFPRI.  
33. Rosenzweig, M. R. and H. P. Binswanger, 1993.Wealth, weather risk and the composition 
and profitability of agricultural investments. The Economic Journal, 103(416): 56-78. 
34. Roumasset, J. A., J. N. Boussard and I. Singh, 1979. Risk, uncertainty and agricultural 
development. Laguna: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Graduate Study and Research 
in Agriculture. 
35. Sadoulet, E. and A. de Janvry, 1995. Quantitative development policy analysis.     
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  
36. Senkondo, E. M. M., 2000. Risk attitude and risk perception in agroforestry decisions: 
The case of Babati, Tanzania. Mansholt studies 17. Wageningen: Wageningen University. 
37. Simtowe, F., 2006. Can risk-aversion towards fertilizer explain part of the non-adoption 
puzzle for hybrid maize? Empirical evidence from Malawi. Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive (MPRA) Paper 1241. 
38. Smith, K., C. B. Barrett, and P. W. Box, , 1999. Participatory risk mapping for targeting 
research and assistance: with an example from East African Pastoralists. 
http/www.cnr.usu.edu/research/crsp/tr199.htm 
39. Stiglitz, J. E., 1989. Rational peasants, efficient institutions and a theory of rural 
organization: methodological remarks for development economics, in BARDHAN P. (ed) 
The economic theory of agrarian institutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 18-29. 
40. The World Bank : http://go.worldbank.org/NMIS5MXCH0 . 
41. van den Berg, M., R. Fort, and K. Burger, 2009. Natural hazards and risk aversion: 
experimental evidence from Latin America. Unpublished paper 
42. Wik, M., T. A. Kebede, O. Bergland and S. T. Holden, 2004. On the measurement of risk 
aversion from experimental data. Applied Economics, 36(21): 2443-2451. 
43. World Bank, 2007. World development report 2008, Agriculture for Development. Washington: 
The world Bank 
 
 
 
